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From taxonomy to cognitivism:
On variants of the lexicographic definition∗
Abstract. The study compares two methods of defining concepts, proposed
by Anna Wierzbicka and Jerzy Bartmiński. Two variants of the maximal
definition are identified: the extended variant, where the definition assumes the
form of a narrative explication (Bartmiński), and the synthetic variant, with
condensed content of the full definition (Wierzbicka, Bartmiński). Similarities
and differences in the approaches of the two scholars to the problem of defining
are discussed. The similarities include: the idea that a full understanding
of a concept should be accounted for, the proposal that all linguistically,
culturally, and communicatively relevant features be reconstructed, that the
definition contain a facet-based ordering of the defining sentences, as well as
the recognition of the importance of linguistic evidence. The differences are
identified in: the style of defining, the use being made of the data, the approach
to the stability of features in the concept being defined, the ultimate shape
(static or dynamic) of the reconstructed image.
Key words: maximal definition, cognitive definition, Anna Wierzbicka, Jerzy
Bartmiński
∗ The article appeared in Polish as “O różnych wariantach definicji leksykograficznej –
od taksonomii do kognitywizmu” in Etnolingwistyka 30. The present English translation
has been financed by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, project titled “English
edition of the journal Etnolingwistyka. Problemy języka i kultury in electronic form” (no.
3bH 15 0204 83).
256 Stanisława Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska
Words are a society’s most basic cultural artefacts, and –
properly understood – they provide the best key to a cul-
ture’s values and assumptions. But to avoid misinterpreta-
tion, definitions are needed that are free of ethnocentric
bias; that is, definitions couched in terms of universal,
culture-free, primitive concepts. (Wierzbicka 1996: 237)
Words resemble crystals that reflect worldview and focus
on its selected aspects; together with other words, artefacts,
people, as well as elements of our personal histories, or the
history of a given speech community, they form a lexical
network. It is therefore true that investigating the lexicon
of a given language provides insight into the wealth of the
culture of that community. (Bartmiński 1986: 18)
1. Towards new paradigms in linguistic description
Within the last fifty years, goals, methods, and objects of defining
concepts, have become key issues, especially when traditional structuralist
paradigms giving way to cognitive, anthropological, and cultural approaches
to definitions.
In 1993, Yuriy Apresyan summed up recent changes in contemporary
linguistics and pointed out three major approaches to research on systemic
lexicography: (1) the reconstruction of the naïve worldview, or conceptual
patterns that underlie lexical and grammatical meanings of a given language;
(2) recognition of the so-called “linguistic macrocosm” that serves as the
background to lexicographic types and bigger units of linguistic and textual
organization; (3) recognition of “linguistic microcosm” and the so-called
“lexicographic portrayals”, i.e. separate senses of a given word with all
linguistically relevant properties (Apresjan 1993: 10).1
A reconstruction of the “lexicographic portrayal” assumes detachment
from the traditional dictionary entry in several ways. Firstly, the lexicographic
definition should not be confined to necessary and sufficient elements, but
should offer an exhaustive characterization of all linguistically relevant
properties of a lexeme. Secondly, in terms of organizing the content of the
definition, it should offer an integrated linguistic description instead of
enumerating separate word senses. Thirdly, the definition should depart from
a typical single-layer dictionary structure, where components of meaning
1 The notion of “lexicographic portrayal” was first proposed by Zholkovski (1964) and
was defined by Apresyan as “comprehensive characteristics of all linguistically relevant
properties of a given lexeme, organised into a unified and integrated lexicographic and
grammatical description” (Apresjan 1993: 16).
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have equal status, but have a complex structure with distinct layers of
presuppositions, assertions, or modal and referential frames.
In theoretical semantics, two distinct approaches to defining concepts
have competed with each other with regard to such parameters as the
object, aims, and the methods of defining. Some authors advocate maximal
definitions, i.e. semantic and cultural explications, the aim of which is to
provide all positive, linguistically, communicatively, and culturally relevant
characteristics of a given object (Bartmiński 1980c, 1984, 1988; Wierzbicka
1985, 1993) – this, to a great extent, converges with Apresyan’s postulates.
However, others stand by traditional definitions, based on syntactic and
semantic principles, where the content is limited to necessary and sufficient
conditions for the identification of the denotated meaning, which renders
that definition fully taxonomic (see e.g. Grochowski 1982, 1993a, b).2
Allowing for new proposals in the methodology of defining concepts,
a new approach that aims at the reconstruction of “the naïve worldview”
(Apresyan 1992 [1974]),3 provisionally called the “extended” definition (which
includes connotations) was proposed by Jerzy Bartmiński with reference to
the research on the language of folklore (Bartmiński 1980a,b). The Lublin
linguist openly declares:
From a linguist’s point of view, the reduction of the number of distinctive features
in the entity being defined to a few necessary ones, sufficient in a classical (taxonomic)
definition, is [. . . ] unacceptable. (Bartmiński 1980c: 25–26; cf. also Bartmiński 1984: 19)
Bartmiński also emphasizes that a reduced (scientific) definition has
a diminished descriptive value:
I see no reason why lexicographic explication should be bereft of all positive elements
that pertain to the meaning of a given word and that are relevant from the perspective
of its use in linguistic texts as well as its use with reference to other words in a given
language. (Bartmiński 1984: 19)
Bartmiński’s approach to defining concepts, thoroughly argued in his 1984
article, is regarded as a breakthrough in a traditional approach to defining
concepts and a new trend in metalexicography (Żmigrodzki 2010: 39). It
was initially assessed as radical in the Polish linguistic milieu in the 1980s,
too bold to meet the expectations of semantic investigation at the time.4
2 Types of definition and approaches to defining concepts are thoroughly discussed by
Krzyżanowski (1993).
3 Hołówka (1986) and Wierzbicka (1993) calls it a “person-in-the-street” perception;
Bartmiński (1988) refers to it as “common sense”.
4 Andrzej Maria Lewicki, in his review of the preliminary installment of The Dictionary
of Folk Stereotypes notes that “the proposed dictionary is an attempt to develop a new
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A solid theoretical background and arguments for a new maximal method
of defining concepts was postulated a year later by Anna Wierzbicka in
her seminal monograph Lexicography and Conceptual Analysis (1985), as
well as in other publications (Wierzbicka 1984, 1993, 2013). Wierzbicka’s
theoretical basis of a new methodology of lexicographic description is also
recalled in Bartmiński (1988), where he introduces the notion of the cognitive
definition understood as a tool of describing connotation (more on this issue
in section 3). Bartmiński’s model is also called “open definition” (Bartmiński
and Tokarski 1993).5
Let us now present two maximal definitions: those of the Polish concepts
of koń ‘horse’ and rower ‘bicycle’ as proposed by the two linguists.
Bartmiński (1980a) proposes an extended 16-page definition of koń
in colloquial and folk Polish. It embraces such aspects as etymology,
hyperonyms, hyponyms, synonyms, co-hyponyms as well as such “se-
mantic subcategories” (facets) as: collections, partitivity, attributes,
quantifiers, agency, subject, stator, process, provenience, ob-
ject, addressee, instrument, location, similarities, oppositions.
A condensed description of koń goes as follows:
A domestic animal, an element of the livestock, big, strong, valuable; wise and faithful.
It helps people and fears the death of its owner; it is used as a saddle-horse or as a draught-
horse (i.e. with a cart and a plough); it occupies the highest position in the livestock
hierarchy, is considered to be the attribute of men (a farmer, a cavalryman, a soldier) as
opposed to the cow, considered to be the attribute of women. Being owner of a horse
symbolized wealth and was the epitome of pride. The horse was also associated with such
features as vibrancy and ghoulishness. (Bartmiński 1980b: 119)
The definition of rower ‘bicycle’ as proposed by Wierzbicka (1985) is
presented in the following way:
type of dictionary”. He also remarks on Bartmiński’s system of defining concepts: “the
idea being proposed is an extremely daring lexicographic experiment, perhaps too daring
for the current state of semantic reflection” (Lewicki 1984).
5 The assumptions of Wierzbicka’s and Bartmiński’s definition (open definition vs. cog-
nitive definition, respectively) have many convergent points, although they have developed
independently. Those convergences, however, are the major focus of this chapter. In one of
my recent publications, I point out that the choice of the terminology is largely arbitrary
because the crux of the matter is that which is defined (in this respect, the meaning of
a word is always open-structured) rather than the openness of the definition itself. As
a result, all analytical research leads to somewhat “closed” definitions, while the proposed
set of characteristic features ascribed to a given object always remains open and dependent
on the proposed types of rationality, the data, intentions and various viewpoints assumed
by researchers and language speakers alike (Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska 2017).
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a kind of thing made by people
it is made for one person to be able to go by means of it
from one place to another [FUNCTION]
faster than by walking and with less effort
being able to take more things than one could carry without effort
being able to sit
and to cause it to move by the movements of one’s legs
Being able to cause it to go anywhere where there is a stretch of flat firm ground
and being able to lift it over a place where the ground is not flat or firm
it has two wheels attached to a thin frame one after the other [CONSTRUCTION AND
so that when it moves both wheels come into contact with MODE OF OPERATION]
the ground in the same places, one after the other
it has a part for the person to sit on
which is attached to the frame near the top
and it has two parts for the person’s feet
which are attached to the frame near the bottom and which are connected with the wheels
so that by pushing these parts with one’s feet one can cause the wheels to turn
at one end of the frame there is a thin movable part which sticks out on both sides of the
frame to support one’s hands
so that by turning this part to one side with one’s hands one can cause the whole thing
to turn to that side
the part to sit on is not too high for a person to be able to sit on it with one foot near
the ground
so that one can raise one’s bottom onto it with one foot touching the ground [SIZE]
but not too low for the person sitting on it to be able to straighten one leg after the other
without touching the ground
the part to put one’s hands on is close enough to put the hands on the part for the hands
but not too close for the arms to be able to move freely when one turns with the hands
supported on them
the wheels are as narrow as they can be without breaking easily and without being too
weak to support a person
the part to sit on is as narrow as it can be without being too narrow for a person to be
able to sit on it
the parts for the feet are as small as they can be without being too small to support
a person’s feet
they are as close to the frame as they can be without being too close to it for a person’s
legs to be able to move freely with the feet supported on them
the part for putting the hands on sticks out on both sides far apart
enough for the arms to be able to move freely when one turns with the hands supported
on them
all the parts are as thin and as light as they can be without breaking easily and without
being too weak to support a person and to move things than one could carry without
effort
This kind of extended definition was criticized by Maciej Grochowski
(1993a). Referring to Wierzbicka’s explications of rower and samochód
‘car’, the author says:
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I cannot accept these explications. Apart from their valuable semantic characteristics,
both definitions offer detailed descriptions of the objects being defined (e.g. the description
of a saddle related to the height of a person riding a bike), typical behaviour of people
cycling or driving, or, finally, subjective feelings that come with those activities. [. . . ]
In my opinion, subjectivity transpires through the following elements: people cover the
distance by riding a bike “with less effort” than by walking; people, by riding a bike or
driving a car, can take more things than they could carry without effort; driving a car is
fast and comfortable, without having to make any bodily effort; driving a car gives the
possibility to see the places people go through; cars protect from the weather and from
the contact with the things outside. (Grochowski 1993a: 72–73)6
Grochowski’s critical attitude towards extended definitions results from
his traditional approach to the description of meaning, where the definition
meets the conditions of semantic representation as specified in structural
semantics. Thus, Grochowski favours a taxonomic definition, where only
categorical “essential” features that appear “in each use of a word are taken
into account”, while the features described as “connotative”, “unnecessary”, or
“irrelevant” are disregarded. In such “minimal” definitions as those, rower
is defined as a vehicle on two wheels, propelled by the movement of one’s
legs (Grochowski 1993a: 73).7 However, the boundary between essential and
connotative features is fuzzy here and in fact impossible to demarcate pre-
cisely. Therefore, maximal definitions have been proposed by Wierzbicka and
Bartmiński, independently, as a counterbalance to the classical lexicographic
definition that Grochowski advocates so ardently.
2. Wierzbicka’s explications
The semantic analyses proposed by Wierzbicka are twofold and lead to
more or less thoroughly developed forms of definition.
The first type of Wierzbicka’s lexicographic analysis is when she seeks the
“core” of basic, universal meanings and their annotation using the rigorous
methods of Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM, cf. Wierzbicka 1996).
6 Despite rigorous rules for the minimal definition according to which only “unques-
tionable properties of semantic expressions” should be allowed, Grochowski claims that it
is still obligatory to recall the concept of rails while defining both train and tram, the
concept of ice while referring to skates, the concept of snow with reference to sledge or
skis, or the movement of legs in the definitions of bicycle, skates, or skis.
7 Similar aspects are recalled while defining other means of transport: train/tram:
a vehicle that runs along a rail track to transport passengers from one place to another;
skates: metal blades attached underfoot to move quickly on ice; sledge: an object used
for travelling over snow; skis: flat narrow pieces of wood that resemble planks and are
fastened to boots, so that people, making movements with their legs, can move over snow
(Grochowski 1993a: 73).
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Such an explication is based on Leibnitz’s conception of “an alphabet of
human thought” as well as on Andrzej Bogusławski’s idea of linguistic
“elementary semantic units” (the so-called indefinibilia).
Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) is a radical approach based on
the evidence that there is a small collection of basic universal meanings:
14 semantic primes as presented in Wierzbicka (1972), through a proposed
set of 37 primes, only to reach the total number of 64 primes8 in a recent
version. All these primes are essential for explicating the meanings of other
words. For Wierzbicka, they have become the key to rigorous and meticulous
descriptions of meanings:
Without the set of primitives, all descriptions of meaning are actually or potentially
circular (as when, for example, to demand is defined as ‘to request firmly’, and to request
as to demand gently’ [. . . ]). Any set of primitives is better than none, because without
some such set semantic description is inherently circular, and, ultimately, untenable. This
doesn’t mean, however, that it is a matter of indifference what set of primitives one is
operating with as long as one has some such set. Far from it: the best semantic descriptions
are worth only as much as the set of primitives on which they are based. For this reason,
for a semanticist the pursuit of the optimal set of primitives must be a matter of first
importance. “ ‘Optimal’ from what point of view”? the skeptics ask. From the point of
view of understanding. (Wierzbicka 1996: 11).
Understanding semantics as understanding linguistic phrases is a key
factor in creating the list of semantic primitives: “to understand anything,
we must reduce the unknown to the known, the obscure to the clear, the
abstruse to the self-explanatory” (Wierzbicka 1996: 27). Below is the list of
semantic universals from Wierzbicka (2011: 18):
i, you, someone, people, something/thing, body Substantives
kind, part Relational Substantives
this, the same, other else another Determiners
one, two, some, all, much/many, little/few Quantifiers
good, bad Evaluators
big, small Descriptors
think, know, want, don’t want, feel, see, hear Mental Predicates
say, words, true Speech
do, happen, move, touch Action, events, movements
be (somewhere), there is, be (someone/
something), (is) mine
Existence, possession
live, die Life and death
when/time, now, before, after, a long time,
a short time, for some time, moment
Time
where/place, here, above, below, far, near,
side, inside, touch (contact)
Space
8 Such is the number empirically attested primes.
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not, maybe, can, because, if Logical Concepts
very, more Intensifier, augmentor
like/as/way Similarity
Semantic primes are specific lexical universals which can be expressed
through such lexical means as words, bound morphemes, or phrases. All
those may be morphologically complex, they may also have various morpho-
semantic properties (they may belong to different parts of speech, appear in
various combinations, and, finally, they may also have clearly defined sets of
syntactic properties; cf. Wierzbicka 2011: 19).
According to the linguist, indefinibilia – a small set of universal semantic
primes – allow us to compare meanings of words from different languages, as
well as discover cross-linguistic similarities and differences. Wierzbicka (1989)
also notes that because various configurations of primes may be expressed
by paraphrases in each natural language, they may be checked against our
intuition.
As examples of explications based on semantic primitives, consider those
of mother and sun:
MOTHER
X is Y’s mother. =
(a) before Y was a person Y was inside X and was like a part of X
(b) because of this one would think that X would think this:
‘I want to do good things for Y
I don’t want bad things to happen to Y’ (Wierzbicka 1999: 34)9
SUN
People in a place can sometimes see it above this place
At some times during the day, people can see this something in some places on the other side of the sky
People may think: at some times during the day, people can see this something in some places on one side of the sky
People can see other things because of it
Sometimes they can feel something good in their bodies because of it (Wierzbicka 1993: 251)
With time, it appeared that the model of semantic primes as proposed
the NSM was too restricted. The necessity not only to broaden the number of
the indefinibilia but also to move beyond the very conception was postulated
by Wierzbicka herself: “it is desirable [. . . ], and perhaps necessary, that our
definitions of concrete concepts such as names of body parts or names of
different parts or aspects of the natural environment should include semantic
9 Each definition should also include, apart from biological components, the social
and psychological component. As noticed by Wierzbicka, such components have to be
“formulated in terms of expectations (thoughts), not in terms of actual events; by contrast,
the biological components [. . . ] have to be formulated as actual” (Wierzbicka 1996: 155).
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‘molecules’ as well as semantic ‘atoms’ ” (Wierzbicka 1996: 221).10 Molecules
were used in the explication of rower ‘bicycle’ (see above) and other
vehicles, as well as those for mugs, cups, cats and dogs, fruit and vegetables.
In Wierzbicka (1993), the author further enriched her explications with
new types of data (standard texts, comics), as well as novel collections of
semantic molecules. Below is the explication of the colloquial English concept
of mouse in colloquial English:11
MOUSE
Kind of an animal CATEGORY
People call them ‘mice’ NAME
They are all of the same kind “ESSENCE”
Because they come from creatures of the same kind ORIGIN
People could say the following things about them:
They live in places or near places where people live HABITAT
Because they want to eat things
Which people keep in those places for eating
people do not want them to live there
(some animals of this kind live in the fields
but in order to imagine an animal of this kind
people imagine it as living
near places where people live)
Someone can easily hold it in one’s hand SIZE
(most people do not want to hold it in hands)
They are greyish or brownish APPEARANCE
They cannot be seen easily
Some animals of this kind are white
Some people use them when they want to know
What happens to them when people do various things to them
Some people keep them at home or near home
Because they want to watch them and take care of them
But in order to imagine such animals
People would imagine them as greyish or brownish animals
They have short legs
This is why the legs cannot be seen when they move quickly
One has the impression that their whole body touches the ground
For this reason they can easily squeeze into small holes in the ground
They are soft
For this reason they can easily squeeze into very narrow holes
Their head looks as if it were not a separate part of the body
10 The list of ca. 200 semantic molecules understood as selected culture-specific units
that relate to historical experiences of speech communities is presented in Goddard (2011).
11 The layout of Wierzbicka’s definition as proposed above is very much in line with
Bartmiński’s definitions that were proposed at approximately the same time (see below).
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The whole body looks as a small thing with a long thin and hairless tail
The front part of their head is moved forward
And has a few hard hairs poking at the sides
There are also two round ears placed at both sides of the top of the head
They have got small sharp teeth to bite things
They do not want to be close to people or other animals BEHAVIOUR
When people or other animals are nearby, they do not produce any sounds
They hide for fear of people and animals
In places where people and animals cannot find them
Animals of other kinds which live in places where people live (cats) want to chase and
kill animals of this kind
People set special things (traps) in their houses or near their houses
To catch animals of this kind and kill them
When they are caught they produce sounds
Which resemble the sound produced by thin things
It sounds as if they wanted to say that something wrong is happening to them
They move in places where people live and try to find something to eat
They can move very quickly
They can move without producing sounds
Sometimes, when they move, quiet sounds can be heard
It sounds as if something light and hard
Was moving on a hard surface
Sometimes very small, dark and roundish pieces of something (excrement) can be seen in
places visited by these animals
People think this of these animals: ATTITUDE TO PEOPLE
They are tiny creatures,
They are quiet,
They do not want people or other animals to be near them,
They can do bad things in places where people live
They like eating a hard yellow substance of a certain kind (cheese) which is eaten by
people (Wierzbicka 1993: 254–256)
Portions of information are arranged in “packets” in the definition’s
structure; these “packets” in Wierzbicka’s terminology are facets (in the case
of mouse, the facets are: category, name, “essence”, origin, habitat,
size, appearance, behaviour, and attitude to people). The choice
and arrangement of facets is designed to represent the cognitive structure
of meaning (Wierzbicka 1985: 132). A good definition should embrace all
significant components of meaning but not in the sense of all available
knowledge about the thing defined: that knowledge should only be included
if it is a part of the concept’s semantic structure. Therefore, the definition
of mouse includes information concerning the animal’s appearance, ways
of moving, the sounds it produces, or attitude towards people and other
animals. The definition neglects such features as in what geographical regions
mice can be found, the pregnancy period, the maximal number of mice in
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a litter, etc.: encyclopedic knowledge of this kind, i.e. specialized knowledge,
is not taken into account (Wierzbicka 1993: 258).12
According to Wierzbicka, all features recalled in the definition should
be supported with relevant linguistic evidence: lexical (words and phrases),
conventional metaphors, proverbs and sayings, literature (poetry in par-
ticular). The scholar also accepts non-linguistic evidence, such as comics,
sketches and drawings, information retrieved from questionnaires carried out
among average speakers and from conversations with them. The explication
itself should not leave “any room for choice” on the part of the lexicographer
because, while analyzing common meanings in natural language, the task of
the researcher is not to ponder what is to be included in the definition but
rather to “discover the meaning in all its essence” (Wierzbicka 1993: 263).13
Therefore, compiling a definition of this kind can be compared to “the work
of a sculptor who with their chisel attempts to uncover the statue hidden in
a cement block” (Wierzbicka 1993: 263).
3. Bartmiński’s cognitive definition
Wierzbicka’s model of definition largely converges with that proposed
by Bartmiński in his preliminary installment of The Dictionary of Folk
Stereotypes (1980a,b,c). The intention was to construct a way of defining
(Bartmiński 1988 calls it a “cognitive definition”) that reflects the view an
entity entertained by speakers of a given language. That view is based
on socially established knowledge of the world verbalized in the form of
judgements concerning people, artefacts, events, as well as in the form of
categorisation and valuation (Bartmiński 1988: 169–170). In short, its goal
12 According to the author, while defining mugs and cups, “no facts [. . . ] that only
potters would know should be included in the definition [. . . ], and no facts that only
zoologists would know should be included in the definition of tiger ” (Wierzbicka 1985: 41).
If possible, a full portrait of a given concept should also include contrasts. For instance, it
is justifiable to refer to horses in the definition of zebra (e.g. “a kind of animal that looks
like a striped horse”). At the same time, it would be unjustified to define the concept
of horse as “a kind of animal that looks like a stripeless zebra” although, as pointed
out by Wierzbicka, “in Hottentot or Zulu the word for horses should be defined partly in
terms of a stripeless zebra” (Wierzbicka 1985: 39). By analogy, when defining tigers, one
should note that “they are similar to cats” but the reverse would be totally unjustified
(Wierzbicka 1985: 39).
13 Therefore, an adequate definition has nothing in common with the metaphor of
a “portrait” proposed by Zholkovskiy (1964; cf. also Apresyan 1993). A good explication
is more like a passport photograph “which instead of showing a face in its uniqueness
would merely record the differences between this face and the faces of the person’s friends
and relatives” (Wierzbicka 1985: 39).
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is to show how the speakers of a given language understand the meaning
of X. The attempt to retrieve all stabilized features in the linguistic and
cultural view of X converges with the claim that there are no clear-cut
boundaries between linguistic and extralinguistic knowledge whenever one
tries to reconstruct the nature of the so-called “mental object” (see Muszyński
1988). To meet this aim, the linguist should take into account not only the
language system but also texts (including questionnaires, i.e. texts that have
been elicited from speakers), as well as the so-called “co-linguistic” data,
i.e. records of beliefs and ritualized practices. Also vital are pragmatic and
extralinguistic components, as well as what structural semantics classified
as contextual features. When criticized for mixing systemic with contextual
features, Bartmiński said: “all features, including systemic ones (e.g. “mother”
is ‘a woman that bears children’) are always expressed against and in a given
context” (Bartmiński 1984: 10).
The aim of the cognitive definition thus formulated was additionally
enhanced by the postulate of content adequacy, i.e. the requirement that
folk knowledge be incorporated into the definition. Of equal importance is
structural adequacy: this is to ensure that the cognitive structure of meaning
reflects linguistic awareness (Bartmiński 1980a,b,c, 1984, 1988). Such an
extended definition, equipped with two types of adequacy, becomes a text
that “narrates” the surrounding world and its fragments (cf. Bartmiński
1987; Bartmiński 2014). Textual narration arises from judgements that
inform the hearer what X is doing at a given moment, how he feels, where
he is, who he interacts with, etc. Judgements about the object that have
basic “certifications” (Bartmiński 2015: 21) are presented in the form of
“stereotypical motifs”,14 and next grouped into categories called “facets”
(following Wierzbicka). Facets differ depending on the object being defined.
Therefore, the specific motifs and arrangements of facets actually bring
the “text” of the definition into being: such definitions reflect subjective
conceptualizations of the potion of reality with X in its centre.15 Therefore,
assuming that definitions express socially established patterns and encode
people’s experience of reality, its conceptualisation and verbalisation in
14 On the notion of motif and its various functions, see Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska 2007:
49–75.
15 Renata Przybylska (2003) compares the cognitive definition with other types of
lexicographic definition discussed in the introduction to The Dictionary of the Polish
Language (SJPDor 1962), i.e. the “real-meaning” definition, the structural-semantic
definition, the scope definition, the synonymic definition, and the grammatical definition.
The author claims that those latter definitions focus mainly on the “objective and factual”
content within the concept being defined, while the cognitive definition in its very essence
makes room for content that depends on and is relativized to the speaking subject.
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a given linguacultural community, it is justified to treat them as texts of
culture (Bartmiński 2011).16
The first attempts to apply the cognitive definition were the descriptions
of koń ‘horse’ (Bartmiński 1980a, see above) and słońce ‘sun’ (Bartmiński
1980b). A thorough description of the latter concept comprises the fol-
lowing elements: hyperonyms, hyponyms, co-hyponyms, collections, parts,
attributes, quantitative chracteristics, actions, feelings, states, processes,
origin, driving forces, influence on people’s feelings, object, addressee, tool,
location, similarities, comparisons, metaphors, symbols, and oppositions.
The concise version says: the sun (słońce) is “the brightest light in the sky
that illuminates and heats the earth, the driving force behind life on earth,
which moves and thus measures time” (Bartmiński 1980b: 205).17
The best examples of maximal and precisely structured definitions, mod-
elled on the cognitive definition and following a faceted arrangement of
content, are those of strzygoń ‘ghost, spectre’ and deszcz ‘rain’ (Bart-
miński 1988: 174; cf. Bartmiński 2009: 69–72). A synthetic representation
of the folk image of demon called strzygoń, reconstructed on the basis of
dialectological, folk and ethnographic data, assumes the following form:
STRZYGOŃ ‘a ghost’ a spectre assuming various forms’
SUPERORDINATE CATEGORY: strzygoń is an evil spirit, a bogy
APPEARANCE: it looks like a phantom, ghost or nightmare; has double teeth, a pale
face, blue marks on the back, blood behind the fingernails, closed eyes [. . . ]
CHARACTERISTICS: it is silent, malicious, importunate
ACTION: it gets up at midnight; wanders about the earth; steals apples from the orchard
at night; eats wax candles from the altar; frightens, strangles, beats, bites and eats people
TIME OF ACTION: it appears at night, midnight; disappears after midnight, when the
cock crows
PLACE OF ACTION: it stays in a coffin, in a tomb, underground; is active in the church,
in the orchard, at home, in the barn
ORIGIN: a person born with two souls who received only one name at baptism
MEANS OF NEUTRALISATION: for a strzygoń to stop frightening people, one must:
put the dead body with its back up or cut its head and put it between the legs, or drive
a nail into its head, or put a piece of paper with the name of Jesus under its tongue, or
ask for the Holy Mass to be celebrated
16 The notion of text of culture is discussed in The Dictionary of Literary Terms (STL
1998: 575) and in Bartmiński and Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska (2009: 72–73).
17 Cf. the definition of słońce ‘sun’ in The Dictionary of the Polish Language (SJPDor
1962): “the star nearest to Earth, the central star in the Solar System, a big ball of gas
of very high temperature that emits energy, thanks to which life on Earth is possible’.
The fact that the cognitive definition is longer is secondary; of crucial importance is its
anthropocentric orientation.
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Similarly schematized definitions that also include the most stabilized
linguistic evidence pertain to the image of bocian ‘stork’ and złoto
‘gold’ (Bartmiński 2015: 22). Consider the first of those, based on faceted
arrangement and stabilized expressions in defining sentences:
STORK
[categorisation] bird
[size] big
[appearance – colour] black and white
[appearance – build] with long red beak
Long neck
Long (bocian ‘a stork’ also refers to a long-legged man) red legs
[behaviour] arrives in spring, departs in autumn
(‘a migrant’; arrival and departure of storks; migration of storks)
Travels in flocks flies in V formation (klucz )
Produces bill-clattering sound (klekot)
Wades in water (brodzi)
Can stand on one leg (stać jak bocian na gnieździe ‘to stand as a stork in a stick nest’)
(in folk tradition) brings babies (bocianówka ‘folk scarf’; wierzyć w bociany ‘to believe
in storks’)
[feeding] feeds on frogs, thus clearing the world
[location] inhabits marshy wetlands
builds large stick nests on buildings, chimneys and poles
Definitions that assume a more textual form (also known as “natural
narrations”) are offered for such concepts as matka ‘mother’ and równość
‘equality’, as well as for all entries in the Dictionary of Folk Stereotypes
and Symbols (SSSL 1996–) and the Axiological Lexicon of Slavs and their
Neighbours (LASiS).
Consider the explication of matka ‘mother’, in narrative form:
matka ‘mother’ (1) is a woman; (2) has a child; (3) raises the child; (4) feeds the child;
(5) the child has a strong bond with the mother; (6) is gentle and warm-hearted towards
the child; (7) the child is warm-hearted towards the mother; (8) the mother has a high
social status; (9) the child should be obedient to the mother; (10) the mother is loved by
the child; (11) the mother is able to recognize her child in the most difficult of situations;
(12) the mother understands the child; (13) is busy and hardworking; (14) good; (15)
emotional; (16) devoted to her children and family; (17) is a person to follow/imitate;
(18) offers help; (19) punishes and beats her children; (20) is irreplaceable for her children;
(21) the child inherits features from the mother; (22) the mother accepts the child without
any reservation; (23) the mother is supportive and disinterested;
in folk culture the mother is presented as follows: (24) she rules the house; (25) gives
advice to her children; (26) teaches the daughter to work; (27) marries daughters off; (28)
as the ruler in the house the mother gives orders, makes children work, scolds, and beats
them; (29) the mother is very strict, she holds a stick and is ready to beat with it; gives
advice to her son; helps her daughter-in-law; (30) is wise. (Bartmiński 1998: 2005)
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The multi-faceted image of mother as presented above undergoes per-
manent modification in real communication, in its variable narrations. Types
of texts and discourse offer various profiles of mother. These profiles are usu-
ally configurations of biological, psychological, social, existential, and ethical
aspects (Bartmiskiy 2005), where the mother may be perceived as the leader
of the hearth and home, a victim of the patriarchal regime, a bad mother,
or the ‘supermother’. These conceptualizations are in concord, respectively,
with axiological connotations found in religious and patriotic discourse,
liberal-feminist discourse, ultra-left discourse, or marketing discourse (cf.
Bielińska-Gardziel 2009).
4. Variants of the maximal definition
As results from selected examples presented above, there are two variants
of the maximal definition: (1) the analytic variant, where the explication is
more developed and resembles narration with features at various levels of
stability; (2) the synthetic variant, which offers the basic cognitive structure
of meaning and the documentation of most strongly stabilized features.
The analytic variant is consistently applied in the Dictionary of Folk
Symbols and Stereotypes (SSSL 1996-), where the entry for słońce ‘sun’
takes 38 pages, for gwiazdy ‘stars’ and księżyc ‘moon’, 17 and 28 pages,
respectively, for woda ‘water’ and ziemia ‘earth’, 82 and 39, respectively,
for świat ‘world’ 65 pages, for żyto ‘rye’ 65 pages, for pszenica ‘wheat’ 39
pages, etc. The definition additionally contains numerous texts arranged by
genre, which illustrate contextual uses of the word (concept). The analytic
variant of defining is also applied publications that pertain to region
‘region’ (Żywicka 2007), rodzina ‘family’ (Bielińska-Gardziel 2009), Europa
‘Europe’ (Żuk 2010), or demokracja ‘democracy’ (Grzeszczak 2015).
The synthetic, or “core” variant of the explication assumes various
forms,18 which differ in terms of:
a) length – definitions can be short (see, e.g. Wierzbicka’a matka
‘mother’) or long (Bartmiński’s definition of mysz ‘mouse’ or strzygoń
‘an evil spirit’);
b) linguistic form – some definitions rely on indefinibilia (e.g. Wierzbicka’s
koń ‘horse’ and słońce ‘sun’), while others operate with colloquial language
(Bartmiński’s koń ‘horse’ and słońce ‘sun’, mysz ‘mouse’, strzygoń ‘an
evil spirit’, bocian ‘stork’);
18 Apart from those presented above, cf. Bartmiński (2015) for an explication of złoto
‘gold’.
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c) type of defining sentences – with the use of a metalanguage proposed
by the researcher (Wierzbicka’s matka ‘mother’, Bartmiński’s słońce ‘sun’,
koń ‘horse’, mysz ‘mouse’) or with fixed textual expressions (strzygoń
‘an evil spirit’);
d) arrangement of judgements referring to the object defined – with the
use of categories or facets (as in the definitions of mysz ‘mouse’, strzygoń
‘an evil spirit’, bocian ‘stork’) or without them (see Wierzbicka’s matka
‘mother’, koń ‘horse’, and Bartmiński’s słońce ‘sun’)
e) the use of linguistic evidence in defining sentences (bocian ‘stork’) or
not (Wierzbicka’s matka ‘mother’, koń ‘horse’, Bartmiński’s słońce ‘sun’).
Despite the fact that all synthetic variants of definitions are diversi-
fied, they all share the characteristics of the maximal definition. Therefore,
they should be viewed as instances of various conventions proposed for
the condensed content of the definition, netherveless still realized in the
of the maximal definition (see e.g. the range of information proposed for
matka ‘mother’ (W), koń ‘horse’ and słońce ‘sun’ (B), mysz ‘mouse’ (W),
strzygoń ’an evil spirit’ (B), or bocian ‘stork’ (B+NB), as well as other def-
initions used in the Dictionary of Folk Symbols and Stereotypes (SSSL) and
the Axiological Lexicon of Slavs and their Neighbours (LASiS). Whichever
convention is followed, these definitions contrast with the minimal definition
(as proposed by Grochowski), so frequently applied in lexicographic practice.
Regardless of “the degree of maximalisation” of all synthetic variants
of the maximal definition proposed here, all of them can be elaborated
on to create a basic set of features of the concepts being reconstructed.
A more developed variant, assuming the form of essayistic or narrative
explication, is applicable to the presentation of the entire conceptual content,
allowing for both strongly stabilised features and occasional ones, coherent
and contradictory elements, those characteristics that are ascribed to X by
speakers who differ in social status, age, sex, viewpoint, or ideology, and,
finally, the features encoded in text diversified with regard to genre and
discourse type.
The body of characteristics that encompass those aspects that are, firstly,
shared, based on common sense, and parts of the same cultural ground (in
the sense of Teun van Dijk, e.g. 1998), and, secondly, those that function as
characteristic traits for a given section of the speach community (for liberals
and Catholics, adults and children, city or country dwellers, women and
men, etc.). Such perceptions of the concept are categorised as its profiles,
determined by specific subjective viewpoints.
An illustration of what constitutes the basic perception of the concept
and what is the result of its profiling is offered by Bartmiński and Żuk
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(2007) in their holistic explication of równość ‘equality’. The same system
of explication was applied in the Axiological Lexicon of Slavs and their
Neighbours (LASiS). Wojciech Chlebda (2016) also argues in favour of it:
Exploration of meaning (or, more broadly, concepts) should be preceded by collecting
appropriate linguistc data as the resource base for further explications. That base must be
made up of systemic data (including dictionaries), manually-excerpted and corpus-based
textual data, as well as survey data retrieved from questionnaires and public opinion polls.
Each type imposes a viewpoint on linguistic evidence and contributes to a preliminary
profiling of a given concept. Nevertheless, the definintion in general and its synthetic
variant in particular, are not the best forum for presenting such profiles: the basis of each
definition should be holistic. It should function as a preliminary synthesis of the data
retrieved from various sources. (Chlebda 2016: 328)
As indicated above, Chlebda distinguishes the sytnthetic definition from
cognitive, context-induced and taxonomic definitions. However, as assumed
in this paper, the sythnetic character of the definition is a type of the
cognitive definition, as it contains cognitive elements that refer to socially
important and common-sense knowledge, all within the worldview of an
average speaker. Therefore, it seems justified to propose such synthetic
variants of the cognitive definition that are not longer than traditional
lexicographic solutions. A variant of this kind can be successfully applied in
dictionaries, its main advantage being a combination of an extensive lexical
description with a practical requirement of “how to combine completeness
with a reasonable size” (Wierzbicka 1996: 258).
Let us now summarize all the observations concerning the defining
practice as postulated by Anna Wierzbicka and Jerzy Bartmiński. In her dis-
cussion of perspectives and methodologies assumed in Lublin-based cognitive
ethnolinguists and her own research school in Canberra, Wierzbicka points
out that the two approaches are “complementary” and have “convergent”
goals (2013: 137). That convergence is manifested in the holistic approach to
defining, with a place for linguistically, culturally, and communicatively rele-
vant features. Also vital is a faceted arrangement of the defining sentences.
Both definition types strive for an anthropologically-oriented and colloquial
shape of the explications, as well as postulating that complex meanings are
reduced to simpler ones. A common feature of the two approaches is also
application of certain solutions from componential analysis, such as the use
of tabulated presentations.
A careful consideration of those definitions19 also allows us to trace
the differences between Wierzbicka’s and Bartmiński’s approaches. The
19 I.e. of mother (Wierzbicka 1985; Bartmiński 1998, Bartminskiy 2005), homeland
(Wierzbicka 1995, 1997 (chapter 4); Bartmiński 1993a) and fate (Wierzbicka 1991;
Bartmiński 2000).
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differences mainly pertain to the style of the definition, the source materials
used, a focus (or lack thereof) on the concept’s stabilized features, and the
ultimate shape of the definition.
An advocate of universal semantics, Wierzbicka uses non-analyzable
“atoms of human thought”, also known as indefinibilia, or larger components
called “semantic molecules”. A characteristic feature of her explications are
also simple (and universal) syntactic structures. Bartmiński remains at
a level higher than indefinibilia: his definitions are written in colloquial style,
which the author considers the most appropriate choice for the purpose.20
However, ever since Wierzbicka began using semantic molecules, i.e. units
semantically more complex than semantic primes, the two approaches have
become more convergent.
While constructing their definitions, both researchers use similar
data: both linguistic and co-linguistic. However, they use data differently.
Wierzbicka stresses the importance of the language system as well as opting
for a moderate character of definitions. She also stresses the researcher’s
introspection,21 while other types of data, such as texts, drawings, or comics
are rarely used. Jerzy Bartmiński, in contrast, places texts on a par with the
language system: texts are its manifestations. Bartmiński opts for stereo-
typed, formulaic texts and pays much attention to co-linguistic data (beliefs,
practices, and rituals) that verify and complement linguistic data. Also,
Bartmiński stresses the importance of questionnaires, which, in his opinion,
20 Colloquial style has an anthropological and cultural basis (see Bartmiński 1993a).
21 In his introductory essay on Anna Wierzbicka, Igor Melchuk (Mielczuk 1999: 19)
points out that introspection is a fundamental tool in linguistic research. Wierzbicka also
stresses its importance in the following observations:
In fact, after a group of people have seriously explored their own consciousness, either
thorough individual study or through group discussion, the final uniformity of their
semantic judgements can be very striking. Having repeatedly witnessed this emergent
uniformity in lexicographic seminars one comes to realize that, in semantics, the road
to intersubjective agreement leads not through a wide net of interviews involving many
informants but through a deep exploration of the individual consciousness. Chasing the
phantom of “objectivity” through supposedly scientific methods one loses the only firm
ground there is in semantics: the terra firma of one’s own deep intuitions. (Wierzbicka
1985: 43)
It must be stressed, however, that shared knowledge includes tacit knowledge, knowledge
which is not immediately available to the speaker but which can be dredged to the surface
of the consciousness by sustained effort. For example, not every speaker of English when
asked about the meaning of “cup” would be able to think immediately of a table, or
of saucers, and few would be able to state quickly and effortlessly the standard which
determines the prototypical size of a cup, and the range of possible variation in size.
Nonetheless all this is, I would maintain, shared knowledge, knowledge that all speakers
can find in their own heads if they dig hard enough. (Wierzbicka 1985: 41)
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allow access to linguistic norms that reside between the language system
and language use. Questionnaires have little significance in Wierzbicka’s idea
of defining and, as such, are treated by her with caution.22
The use of various types of data for defining concepts has an impact
on how scholars address the issue of stable features of the concept being
defined. For instance, Janusz Anusiewicz (1995), notes the indistinctness
and gradation of semantic components, as well as pointing out the various
stages at which linguistic units are stabilized:
All cognitive processes that aim to identify a typical object [. . . ] are important for
both Bartmiński and Wierzbicka. However, contrary to other researchers, it is Bartmiński
who stresses the importance of linguistic analysis, description, and presentation of such
complex linguistic units as topoi, formulae, or idioms. In searching for the topoi hidden in
the expressions “a beautiful horse” or “a fluffy cat”, scholars commit themselves to certain
methodological solutions with regard to the stabilization of such units: in the case of
the cognitive definition the boundaries are open. The features being presented remain
fuzzy and display various degrees of gradation. Such an attitude is highly innovative: it
is based on the assumptions proposed by cognitive linguists and stands in opposition
to Wierzbicka’s model of concept defining. Both Bartmiński’s approach and cognitive
linguistics seek to identify the semantic components that can appear in the definition and
that have the lexical potency to be stabilized, thus becoming the basis for creating more
complex linguistic units, especially phraseological units. The fuzziness and gradation of
semantic components often results from the fuzziness at the very first stage of meaning
stabilization. Consider the following question: Is the semantic fusion of words puszysty
‘fluffy’ and kot ‘cat’ stabilized enough to be categorized as a complex linguistic unit?
In many such cases this is a matter of degree. Those are visibly convergent points in
Bartmiński’s approach and the Western cognitivist tradition. (Anusiewicz 1995: 106–107)
The most important difference that can be observed between Wierzbicka’s
and Bartmiński’s approaches to concept defining pertains to the framework
of the definition: Wierzbicka’s explications are monolithic and static, while
Bartmiński’s include both static images of a given concept (as in the Dic-
tionary of Folk Symbols and Stereotypes (SSSL)) and its dynamic versions
(e.g. in the Axiological Lexicon of Slavs and their Neighbours (LASiS)). The
difference can be illustrated with the concept ojczyzna ‘homeland’, defined
by Wierzbicka as a unified conceptual entity grounded in the 19th-c. Roman-
tic tradition, and by Bartmiński’s as a heterogeneous entity that functions
in a few variants. Wierzbicka proposes what follows (1997: 190–191):
OJCZYZNA (homeland)
(1) a country
(2) I was born in this country
(3) I am like a part of this country
22 On ethnolinguistically relevant data, see Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska 2018.
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(4) I can’t be like a part of any other country
(5) when I think about this country, I feel something good
(6) if I didn’t, this would be very bad
(7) I think something like this when I think about this country:
(8) this country is not like any other country
(9) many bad things happened to this country
(10) I don’t want bad things to happen to this country
(11) this country did many good things to me
(12) like a mother does good things for her children
(13) I want to do good things to this country
(14) if I feel something bad because of this I don’t want to do these things because of this
(15) many other people think the same when they think about this country
(16) many people feel something good when they think about this country
(17) these people are like one thing
(18) I am like a part of this thing
(19) these people say things in the same way
(20) these people do many things in the same way
(21) these people think about many things in the same way
(22) these people often feel in the same way
(23) when I think about these people, I feel something good
(24) these people are like a part of this country
(25) before this time, for a long time many other people were like a part of this country
(26) I am like a part of all these people
(27) in many ways, I am like these people
While defining the same concept, Bartmiński (1993b) emphasizes its
semantic plasticity and constructs a set of configurations of three dimensions:
spatial, social, and axiological. It is those configurations that amount to
a thorough understanding of the concept. The spatial dimension has a radial
shape and involves “circles of identity”, from one’s home, through neighbour-
hood, hometown, region, country, Europe, to the world array. This aligns
with (i) the key notions that one takes as frames of reference in identity
construction: family, house, neighbours, tribe, nation, humankind; and (ii)
the values of closeness to another person, being and feeling at home, security,
freedom and independence, but also peace and solidarity.
This linguacultual image of ojczyzna has two variants: besides the
dominant national-patriotic profile, there also exist the so-called “little
homeland”, local or regional, as well as the European and global homeland.
Whichever variant is selected, it is fully integrated with the values that are
ascribed to it. Bartmiński views the concepts of ojczyzna as dynamic and
evokes the road metaphor:
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In the overall semantic dynamicity, the basic meaning has an axiological nature.
Values act as a stimulus for the dynamics in space and in communal life: they determine
choice within each and contribute to ideologically profiled configurations. Values also
build hierarchies. It is thanks to its values that homeland may be conceptualized as
a road. For an average person, Poland, Europe, the world (including heaven) as well as
one’s country, region, neighbourhood, or family home may be their homeland, for each
every person assumes responsibility. (Bartmiński 2002: 47)
One more difference between Wierzbicka’s and Bartmiński’s models of
definition lies in their respective approaches to language. As Anusiewicz
(1995: 98) points out, Wierzbicka mainly focuses on the language system
and linguistic competence, rather than on communication and communica-
tive competence, as it is postulated in cognitive and cultural linguistics. It
appears that her model is mainly based on the de Saussurean distinction
between system and usage (langue vs. parole). In contrast, Bartmiński’s
framework, which includes the communicative component (texts, question-
naires), adheres to the tri-partite model of system-norm-usage, as proposed
by Louis Hjelmslev and Eugenio Coşeriu.
Translated by Agnieszka Mierzwińska-Hajnos
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